The book is splendid: a joy to read, tightly argued and very well structured. […] In sum, this is a major contribution, recommended to anyone interested in topics at the intersection between intu- tionism and classical logic and mathematics. The common assumption that intuitionism and classicism are equally legitimate enterprises corresponding to different understandings of logical or mathematical expressions is investigated and rejected, and the major intuitionistic arguments against classic logic are scrutinised and repudiated. Haverkamp argues that the disagreement between intuitionism and classicism is a fundamental logical and mathematical dispute which cannot be resolved by means of meta-mathematical, epistemological, or semantic considerations.

Katharina Felka
Talking About Numbers
Easy Arguments for Mathematical Realism
2015. 188 Seiten. Kt 49.- €

Studies in Theoretical Philosophy 3

For thousands of years philosophers have discussed the question of whether numbers exist. Surprisingly, there are very easy arguments from commonly accepted truths that seem to decide the question. For instance, it is a commonly accepted truth that Obama has two hands. If Obama has two hands, then the number of Obama’s hands is two, and, thus, numbers exist. If such arguments were convincing, ontological disputes about the existence of numbers could be decided simply by pointing to Obama’s hands! The book offers a defense of the profoundness of traditional ontological questions by showing that the easy arguments in question are based on false linguistic assumptions. To do so it engages with recent linguistic research and develops analyses of the pertinent sentences that are of interest far beyond the met ontological question at hand.

The book is splendid: a joy to read, tightly argued and very well structured […] In sum, this is a major contribution, recommended to anyone interested in topics at the intersection between the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mathematics.» dialectica

If Art is smart and Art is rich, then someone is both smart and rich – namely, Art. And if Art is smart and Art is smart, then Art is something that Bart is, too – namely, smart. The first claim involves first-order quantification, a generalization concerning what kinds of things there are. The second involves second-order quantification, a generalization concerning what there is for things to be. Or so it appears. Following W. V. O. Quine, many philosophers have endorsed a thesis of Ontological Collapse about second-order quantification. They maintain that ultimately, second-order quantification reduces to first-order quantification over sets or properties, and therefore also carries the latter’s distinctive ontological commitments. In this book, awarded the Wolfgang-Steigmüller-Preis in 2012, Stephan Krämer examines the major arguments for Ontological Collapse in detail and finds all of them wanting.

Stephan Krämer
On What There Is For Things To Be
Ontological Commitment and Second-Order Quantification
2014. 260 Seiten. Kt 34.- €

Studies in Theoretical Philosophy 2

Since the 1970s, when Michael Dummett tried to sub- stantiate L. E. J. Brouwer’s revolutionary criticism of mathematical methods and theories, the debate between intuitionists and classicalists has remained a central philo- sophical dispute with far-reaching implications for mathe- matics, logic, epistemology, and semantics. In this book, Nick Haverkamp presents a detailed analysis of the intui- tionistic criticism of classical logic and mathematics. The common assumption that intuitionism and classicalism are equally legitimate enterprises corresponding to different understandings of logical or mathematical expressions is investigated and rejected, and the major intuitionistic argu- ments against classical logic are scrutinised and repu- diated. Haverkamp argues that the disagreement between intuitionism and classicism is a fundamental logical and mathematical dispute which cannot be resolved by means of meta-mathematical, epistemological, or semantic con- siderations.

Nick Haverkamp
Intuitionism vs. Classicism
A Mathematical Attack on Classical Logic
2015. XVI, 270 Seiten. Kt 34.- €
ISBN 978-3-465-03906-8

Studies in Theoretical Philosophy 2

Einer Auswahl weiterer Bücher zur Analytischen Philosophie:

Wolfgang Körner
Die Philosophische Logik
Gottlob Frege
Ein Kommentar mit den Texten des Vorworts zu Grundgesetze der Arithmetik und der Logischen Untersuchungen I–IV
2010. 840 Seiten. Kt 29,80 €
ISBN 978-3-465-04062-0
Klostermann Rote Reihe 30

»An diesem Buch wird niemand vorbeigehen können, der sich mit Frege’s Denken und den Diskussionen, die es bis heute anregt, be-fasst.« Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie

Andreas Kemmerling
Glauben
Essay über einen Begriff
2017. XXVII, 684 Seiten. Ln 98.- €
ISBN 978-3-465-03976-1
The term «know» is one of the ten most common verbs in English, and yet a central aspect of its usage remains mys- terious. Our willingness to ascribe knowledge depends not just on epistemic factors such as the quality of our evidence. It also depends on seemingly non-epistemic factors. For in- stance, we become less inclined to ascribe knowledge when it’s important to be right, or once our attention is drawn to possible sources of error. Accounts of this phenomenon proliferate, but no consensus has been achieved, decades of research notwithstanding. The author offers a fresh examination of this ongoing debate. After reviewing and complementing relevant data from both armchair and experi- mental philosophy, he assesses extant accounts of this phenomenon with relativism. It combines a more standard semantic approach. The book discusses both classic and recent litera- tics with a novel pragmatic theory to develop a superior theory. It spells out two versions of Semantic Pluralism: Flexible Pluralism, which takes many expressions to be context-sensitive, and Strong Pluralism, which denies that context-sensitivity is widespread. And it shows how Plu- ralists can reply to several objections that have been lobbed against non-propositional semantic theories.

What is the content of a sentence in context? A proposition, says the hitherto little-ex- plored view of Semantic Pluralism. To achieve this aim, the book puts forward two arguments against Contextualism, the most popular propositional theory. It spells out two versions of Semantic Pluralism: Flexible Pluralism, which takes many expressions to be context-sensitive, and Strong Pluralism, which denies that context-sensitivity is widespread. And it shows how Pluralists can reply to several objections that have been lobbed against non-propositional semantic theories.

People disagree frequently, about both objective and sub- jective matters. But while at least one party must be wrong in a disagreement about objective matters, it seems that both parties can be right when it comes to subjective ones: it seems that there can be faultless disagreements. But how is this possible? How can people disagree with one another if they are both right? And why should they? In recent years, a number of philosophers and linguists have argued that we must become relativists about truth to understand faultless disagreements. This book shows that we can dis- pense with relativism. It combines a more standard semantic- tics with a novel pragmatic theory to develop a superior approach. The book discusses both classic and recent litera- ture in philosophy and linguistics. It provides a general introduction to the debate about the semantics and prag- matics of perspectival expressions, as well as an original contribution to the contemporary discussion.

The book discusses the central notion of logic: the concept of logical consequence. It shows that the classical defini- tion of consequence as truth preservation in all models must be restricted to admissible models. The challenge for the philosophy of logic is therefore to supplement the defi- nition with a criterion for admissible models. The problem of logical constants, so prominent in the current debate, constitutes but a special case of this much more general demarcation problem. The book explores the various di- mensions of the problem of admissible models and argues that standard responses are unwarranted. As a result, it de- velops a new vision of logic, suggesting in particular that logic is deeply imbued with metaphysics.

What does it mean to know how to do something? This book develops a comprehensive account of know-how, a crucial epistemic goal for all who care about getting things right. It proposes a novel interpretation of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle, according to which know-how is a competence, a complex ability to do well in an activity in virtue of guidance by an understanding of what it takes to do so. This idea is developed into a full-fledged account of Rylean responsibilism, which understands know-how in terms of the normative guidance and responsible control of one’s acts. Within the complex current debate about know- how, this view occupies a middle ground position between the intellectualist claim that know-how just is proposi- tional or objectual knowledge and the anti-intellectualist claim that know-how just is ability. In genuine know-how, practical ability and guiding intellect are both necessary, but essentially intertwined.

Not all truths are on a par. The realm of truths is structu- red: some propositions are only true because others are. The relation that endows the realm of truths with this structure is often called grounding. Grounding has achie- ved much attention in 21st century metaphysics, but the topic is arguably as old as philosophy itself. This becomes apparent when investigating the works of the 19th-centu- ry logic philosopher Bernard Bolzano, who developed what is perhaps the first comprehensive theory of grounding, dra- wing on a rich tradition that goes back to Aristotle’s Poste-