Studies in Theoretical Philosophy

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The term »know« is one of the ten most common verbs in English, and yet a central aspect of its usage remains mysterious. Our willingness to ascribe knowledge depends not just on epistemic factors such as the quality of our evidence. It also depends on seemingly non-epistemic factors. For instance, we become less inclined to ascribe knowledge when it’s important to be right, or once our attention is drawn to possible sources of error. Accounts of this phenomenon proliferate, but no consensus has been achieved, decades of research notwithstanding. Alexander Dinges offers a fresh examination of this ongoing debate. After reviewing and complementing relevant data from both armchair and experimental philosophy, he assesses extant accounts of this data including semantic, metaphysical, pragmatic, doxastic as well as more recent psychological accounts. Against this background, he offers a novel psychological account based on the idea that non-epistemic factors affect estimates of probability.

What is the content of a sentence in context? A proposition, says the standard propositional view accepted in much of semantics. A set of propositions, says the hitherto little-explored view of Semantic Pluralism. The aim of this
book is to motivate, develop and defend Semantic Pluralism. To achieve this aim, the book puts forward two arguments against Contextualism, the most popular propositional theory. It spells out two versions of Semantic Pluralism: Flexible Pluralism, which takes many expressions to be context-sensitive, and Strong Pluralism, which denies that context-sensitivity is widespread. And it shows how Pluralists can reply to several objections that have been lodged against non-propositional semantic theories.

People fight a lot. Both about objective and about subjective matters. But while at least one party to a dispute must be wrong in a disagreement about objective matters, it seems that both parties can be right when it comes to subjective ones: it seems that there can be faultless disagreements. But how is this possible? How can people disagree with one another if they are both right? And why should they? Over the last 15 years, various philosophers and linguists have argued that we have to become relativists about truth to explain what is going on. This book shows that we can dispense with relativism. It combines a conservative semantic claim with a novel pragmatic one to develop the superiority approach. The book discusses both classic and recent, as well as general and debate-specific literature in philosophy and linguistics and provides an introduction as well as an original contribution to the recent debate on the semantics and pragmatics of perspectival expressions.
The book discusses the central notion of logic: the concept of logical consequence. It shows that the classical definition of consequence as truth preservation in all models must be restricted to all admissible models. The challenge for the philosophy of logic is therefore to supplement the definition with a criterion for admissible models. The problem of logical constants, so prominent in the current debate, constitutes but a special case of this much more general demarcation problem. The book explores the various dimensions of the problem of admissible models and argues that standard responses are unwarranted. As a result, it develops a new vision of logic, suggesting in particular that logic is deeply imbued with metaphysics.

Not all truths are on a par. The realm of truths is structured: some propositions are only true because others are. The relation that endows the realm of truths with this structure is often called grounding. Grounding has achieved much attention in 21st century metaphysics, but the topic is arguably as old as philosophy itself. This becomes apparent when investigating the works of the 19th-century philosopher Bernard Bolzano, who developed what is perhaps the first comprehensive theory of grounding, drawing on a rich tradition that goes back to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Roski’s book provides, for the first time, a comprehensive study of Bolzano’s theory of grounding in
its entirety, paying more attention than previous studies to the interaction between grounding and the consequence-relation of deducibility.

What does it mean to know how to do something? This book develops a comprehensive account of know-how, a crucial epistemic goal for all who care about getting things right. It proposes a novel interpretation of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle, according to which know-how is a competence, a complex ability to do well in an activity in virtue of guidance by an understanding of what it takes to do so. This idea is developed into a full-fledged account, Rylean responsibilism, which understands know-how in terms of the normative guidance and responsible control of one’s acts. Within the complex current debate about know-how, this view occupies a middle ground position between the intellectualist claim that know-how just is propositional or objectual knowledge and the anti-intellectualist claim that know-how just is ability. In genuine know-how, practical ability and guiding intellect are both necessary, but essentially intertwined.

For thousands of years philosophers have discussed the question of whether numbers exist. Surprisingly, there are
very easy arguments from commonly accepted truths that seem to decide the question. For instance, it is a commonly accepted truth that Obama has two hands. If Obama has two hands, then the number of Obama’s hands is two, and, thus, numbers exist. If such arguments were convincing, ontological disputes about the existence of numbers could be decided simply by pointing to Obama’s hands! The book offers a defense of the profoundness of traditional ontological questions by showing that the easy arguments in question are based on false linguistic assumptions. To do so it engages with recent linguistic research and develops analyses of the pertinent sentences that are of interest far beyond the metaontological question at hand.

Since the 1970s, when Michael Dummett tried to substantiate L.E.J. Brouwer’s revolutionary criticism of mathematical methods and theories, the debate between intuitionists and classicists has remained a central philosophical dispute with far-reaching implications for mathematics, logic, epistemology, and semantics. In this book, Nick Haverkamp presents a detailed analysis of the intuitionistic criticism of classical logic and mathematics. The common assumption that intuitionism and classicism are equally legitimate enterprises corresponding to different understandings of logical or mathematical expressions is investigated and rejected, and the major intuitionistic arguments against classical logic are scrutinised and repudiated. Haverkamp argues that the disagreement between intuitionism and classicism is a fundamental logical and mathematical dispute which cannot be resolved by means of meta-mathematical, epistemological, or semantic considerations.
If Art is smart and Art is rich, then someone is both smart and rich – namely, Art. And if Art is smart and Bart is smart, then Art is something that Bart is, too – namely, smart. The first claim involves first-order quantification, a generalization concerning what kinds of things there are. The second involves second-order quantification, a generalization concerning what there is for things to be. Or so it appears. Following W.V.O. Quine, many philosophers have endorsed a thesis of Ontological Collapse about second-order quantification. They maintain that ultimately, second-order quantification reduces to first-order quantification over sets or properties, and therefore also carries the latter’s distinctive ontological commitments. In this book, awarded the Wolfgang-Stegmüller-Prize in 2012, Stephan Krämer examines the major arguments for Ontological Collapse in detail and finds all of them wanting.
Buches entwickelt hat und in welchen Hinsichten er seine frühere Auffassung revidiert hat.

Wolfgang Künne

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»Die analytische Brillanz dieses Autors [wird] durch die Unermüdlichkeit seines Zweifels noch überboten.« Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger